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DON’T MAKE A FEDERAL CASE OUT OF IT:  AN 
ARGUMENT WHY THE CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS 
AFFECTED BY A NATIONWIDE FRAUD SHOULD 
NOT BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS ACTION UNDER 
RULE 23(B)(3) 
Matthew S. Connors* 
This comment argues that many nationwide fraud class actions 
asserting state law claims should not be certified under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  The Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
Constitution requires the claims and defenses available to a plaintiff and a 
defendant to remain constant regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to 
pursue her claims individually or in a class action.
1
  Under the laws of 
thirty-five US states,
2
 when a domiciliary is defrauded in her home state by 
a defendant acting in that state, that state‘s laws should determine the 
parties‘ rights.
3
  Therefore, assuming that a defendant is domiciled in one 
of those thirty-five states and that a given nationwide class action includes 
at least one plaintiff from every one of those thirty-five states who is 
defrauded in her home state,
4
 any court adjudicating the action would be 
 
 * B.A. 2008, New York University; J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. 
 1. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that even in the 
context of a nationwide class action, the Kansas Supreme Court could not ―abrogate the 
rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within 
them‖ (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930))). 
 2. This comment only examines the laws of thirty-five states because the question of 
which state‘s laws determine the rights of parties is answered by a choice of law analysis, 
and only thirty-five states have adopted one of the three choice of law rules that have 
received significant scholarly discussion and practical application. 
 3. Throughout this comment, plaintiffs are referred to as ―her,‖ and defendants are 
referred to as ―him.‖  The term ―right‖ is used to refer to claims and defenses collectively. 
 4. In Section IV below, this comment suggests that these assumptions hold in two 
recent district court cases. 
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required to ―apply‖ the laws of thirty-five different states. 
Although a court could constitutionally adjudicate in such a manner it 
would be extremely inefficient, and would not be an option for class 
actions certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  A class 
action may be maintained under 23(b)(3) only if ―the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.‖
5
  
Although it is possible that common questions of fact could predominate 
over individual ones in a nationwide fraud, this comment suggests that 
multiple statewide class actions would more fairly and efficiently 
adjudicate the rights of parties involved in a nationwide fraud than would a 
nationwide class action.  Thus, this comment argues that when a defendant 
defrauds a nationwide class of plaintiffs in their home states, the claims of 
those plaintiffs should not be certified as a nationwide class action under 
Rule 23(b)(3).  If this argument is persuasive, it will suggest that two recent 
district court cases, certifying nationwide fraud class actions,
6
 were 
incorrectly decided. 
The remainder of this comment proceeds in five sections.  Section I 
explains why the rights of a plaintiff and a defendant remain constant 
regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to pursue her claims individually 
or in a class action.  Section II is divided into three subsections which 
discuss how parties‘ rights are determined under:  (A) the territorial 
approach; (B) interest analysis; and (C) the Second Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws, respectively.  Section II concludes that any state that has adopted 
one of those three approaches to choice of law ought to determine that 
when a defendant defrauds a plaintiff in her home state, the laws of the 
plaintiff‘s home state should determine her rights, as well as those of the 
defendant.  Moreover, since the rights of a plaintiff and a defendant remain 
constant regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to pursue her claims 
individually or in a class action, any court that determines parties‘ rights 
using the territorial approach,  interest analysis, or the Second Restatement 
ought to come to the following conclusion:  When a defendant defrauds a 
class of plaintiffs in their home states, the laws of a particular plaintiff‘s 
home state should determine her rights, and the laws of that state should 
also determine the rights of the defendant with regard to his actions 
 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 6. See In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46 (D.N.J. 2009) 
(maintaining a class comprised of plaintiffs from all fifty states under Rule 23(b)(3), and 
using New Jersey‘s law of consumer fraud to determine the rights of all plaintiffs and the 
defendant, a Delaware limited liability company); Kelley v. Microsoft, 251 F.R.D. 544 
(W.D. Wash. 2008) (maintaining a nationwide consumer fraud class action under Rule 
23(b)(3), and using Washington law to determine the rights of all plaintiffs and the 
defendant, a Washington corporation with its headquarters in Washington). 
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affecting that particular plaintiff. 
Section III discusses how the rights available to parties under the 
territorial approach, interest analysis, and the Second Restatement ought to 
affect the Rule 23(b)(3) certification process.  Section III concludes that 
because the rights of a plaintiff and a defendant ought to be determined by 
the laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state even when that plaintiff 
aggregates her claims with the claims of others, multiple statewide class 
actions would more fairly and efficiently adjudicate the rights of parties 
involved in a nationwide fraud than would a nationwide class action.  Thus, 
when a defendant defrauds a nationwide class of plaintiffs in their home 
states, those plaintiffs will not be able to meet the superiority requirement 
of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Section IV discusses two recent district court decisions that reached 
the opposite conclusion.  Each decision certified the claims of a nationwide 
class of plaintiffs who were defrauded in their home states.  Section IV 
suggests that those decisions were erroneous because of a flawed choice of 
law analysis.  If the courts rendering those decisions had performed a 
correct choice of law analysis, each court should have determined that the 
class of plaintiffs before it could not meet the superiority requirement of 
Rule 23(b)(3).  Finally, Section V offers some concluding remarks. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE RIGHTS OF A PLAINTIFF AND A 
DEFENDANT TO REMAIN CONSTANT 
The Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution requires the 
claims and defenses available to a plaintiff and a defendant to remain 
constant regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to pursue her claims 
individually or in a class action.
7
  The reason for the Supreme Court‘s 
pronouncement can be explained as follows.  When a person is harmed, 
one or more laws may grant her one or more claims, and under certain 
circumstances she may be permitted to pursue her claims jointly with 
others who have similar claims.
8
  By pursuing her claim jointly with others, 
however, a plaintiff does not gain additional claims.  Similarly, a defendant 
is not stripped of any defenses to a given claim simply because that claim 
has been joined with others.  In short, the fact that plaintiffs have chosen to 
utilize a procedural advantage does not alter either their substantive rights 
or those of the defendant.
9
 
 
 7. Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 822. 
 8. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20 & 23 (providing mechanisms by which plaintiffs can 
pursue claims jointly). 
 9. See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 
572 (1996) (making a similar argument:  ―We start with claims that everyone concedes 
would otherwise be adjudicated under different laws.  We combine these claims, whether 
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II.  THE RIGHTS OF A PLAINTIFF AND A DEFENDANT 
When a plaintiff alleges that she has been defrauded, her rights and 
those of the defendant are delineated by state law.
10
  State legislatures, 
however, typically do not include, within a particular law, an exhaustive 
list of all the situations in which that law grants rights.  Courts usually 
assume that legislatures intend for their laws to reach wholly intrastate 
matters, and that legislatures do not intend for their laws to reach matters 
that have no contacts with their state.  But does a state legislature intend for 
a law to grant rights to one of its domiciliaries when that domiciliary is 
defrauded in another state?  In order to answer such questions, courts have 
traditionally looked to choice of law rules. 
Currently, thirty-five states have adopted either the territorial 
approach, interest analysis, or the Second Restatement as their choice of 
law rule for purposes of frauds.
11
  Thus, by examining those three 
approaches to choice of law it can be determined whether the states that 
have adopted one of those three approaches would grant parties rights in a 
given situation. 
The remainder of this Section is divided into three subsections which 
discuss:  (A) the territorial approach; (B) interest analysis; and (C) the 
Second Restatement, respectively.  Subsection A concludes that any state 
adhering to the territorial approach would determine that when a defendant 
defrauds a plaintiff in her home state, the laws of that state should 
determine the plaintiff‘s rights, as well as those of the defendant.  
Subsection B concludes that any state adhering to interest analysis and 
using comparative impairment as its rule of priority ought to make the 
same determination.  Finally, Subsection C concludes that any state 
adhering to the Second Restatement would also determine that when a 
plaintiff is defrauded in her home state, that state‘s laws should determine 
her rights and those of the defendant. 
 
through transfer and consolidation or by certifying a class, on the ground that we can 
adjudicate the parties' rights more effectively and efficiently in one big proceeding.  So far, 
so good.  Then, having constructed this proceeding, we are told we must change the parties' 
rights to facilitate the consolidated adjudication.  And that makes no sense.‖). 
 10. See Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr., Note, Aggregate Reliance and Overcharges: 
Removing Hurdles to Class Certification for Victims of Mass Fraud, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 
295 (2010) (explaining that whether a plaintiff has a fraud claim will turn on state law 
because ―there is no national fraud law‖ (quoting In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 141 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002))). 
 11. Ten states adhere to the territorial approach, California uses interest analysis, and 
twenty-four states follow the Second Restatement.  Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 
in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 
279–80 (2009).  Professor Symeonides‘ survey discusses torts generally, but a fraud is 
typically considered a tort.  See, e.g., Brown v. U.S., 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(stating that ―fraud as a cause of action lies in tort‖). 
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A.  The Territorial Approach 
States that have adopted the territorial approach as their choice of law 
approach for frauds use the rule of lex loci delicti to determine if their law 
grants any rights to a given set of parties.
12
  Under lex loci delicti, the law 
of ―the place of wrong‖ determines the rights of the parties.
13
  The ―place of 
the wrong‖ is the place where the last act necessary to create a claim 
occurred.
14
  States that have adopted the territorial approach do not use it to 
select a particular law but, rather, to determine whether they have the 
authority to regulate the conduct at issue.
15
  If the last act necessary to 
create a claim occurs in a state that has adopted the territorial approach, 
then that state will view itself, and only itself, as having the legitimate 
ability to determine the rights of the person injured as well as the person 
who injured her. 
A state that has adopted the territorial approach has determined that 
only its laws are effective within its borders.  Such a state views itself as 
having ―complete and unchallengeable authority over matters within its 
sphere of sovereignty . . . [such] that no [other] state may meddle‖ in 
conduct occurring within its territory.
16
  As a corollary, states adopting the 
territorial approach expressly disclaim the ability to have their laws 
determine the rights of parties whose conduct occurs outside of their state‘s 
borders.  In other words, ―[t]he territorial principle is a rule of scope, which 
sets the reach of state laws equal to their geographic boundaries.‖
17
  
Therefore, the only question a state that has adopted the territorial approach 
needs to ask is:  Where did the tort occur? 
Treating that one question as dispositive, however, has led to some 
decisions that strike many as intuitively incorrect.  One infamous example 
 
 12. Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming currently adhere to the territorial approach 
in the torts context.  Symeonides, supra note 11, at 279–80. 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934) (applying the 
territorial approach and stating:  ―If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, 
a cause of action will be recognized in other states . . . [, but i]f no cause of action is created 
at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state.‖). 
 14. Id. at § 377 (―The place of the wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.‖). 
 15. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State 
Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 37, 41 (1998) (―Under the territorial approach, choice of 
law rules gave effect to rights that vested when a particular event occurred; the law that 
applied was that of the place where the event occurred because only that state had legitimate 
authority to deal with the matter.‖ (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat‘l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 
126 (1904))). 
 16. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 (1995). 
 17. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (2009). 
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is Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll.
18
  The plaintiff in 
Carroll was a citizen of Alabama, the defendant was an Alabama 
corporation, and they entered into an employment contract in Alabama 
where almost all of the work was to be performed.
19
  Moreover, the 
plaintiff was injured when a train car was uncoupled, and if the defendant‘s 
employees had not been negligent in Alabama by failing to properly inspect 
the train‘s couplings, the plaintiff would not have been injured.
20
 
An Alabama court, however, determined that all of those facts were 
irrelevant because the plaintiff was injured in Mississippi:  ―Up to the time 
this train passed out of Alabama no injury had resulted . . . .  The fact 
which created the right to sue,—the injury,—without which confessedly no 
action would lie anywhere, transpired in the state of Mississippi.‖
21
  Thus, 
the Carroll court determined that the plaintiff could only recover, if at all, 
under the laws of Mississippi.
22
 
When Carroll was decided, Mississippi, Alabama, and most likely 
every other state adhered to the territorial approach,
23
 so the court was 
probably correct that Mississippi law governed the rights of the parties.  
The problem was that Mississippi law refused to permit employees to 
recover from their employer for the negligence of fellow employees, while 
Alabama law allowed such recoveries.
24
  Thus, the plaintiff in Carroll was 
denied a claim he would have been granted had his injury occurred in 
Alabama.
25
  This result strikes many as intuitively incorrect given that the 
plaintiff and defendant were both from Alabama, the plaintiff contracted to 
work for the defendant in Alabama, and most of the work that the plaintiff 
performed for the defendant was performed in Alabama. 
To avoid outcomes like that in Carroll, courts have developed several 
methods, referred to as ―escape devices.‖
26
  A comprehensive discussion of 
escape devices is beyond the scope of this comment.  What is important to 
note, however, is that escape devices are inconsistent with the territorial 
approach.  States that adhere to the territorial approach have determined 
 
 18. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892). 
 19. Id. at 803-04. 
 20. Id. at 804. 
 21. Id. at 806. 
 22. Id. at 804-05. 
 23. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (5th ed. 
2006) (explaining that until the 1960‘s choice of law analysis in the US was based on the 
territorial approach). 
 24. Alabama Great S. R.R. Co., 11 So. at 805 (―It is, however, further contended that 
the plaintiff, if his evidence be believed, has made out a case for the recovery sought under 
the employers' liability act of Alabama, it being clearly shown that there is no such or 
similar law of force in the state of Mississippi.‖). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 39-84 (7th ed. 2006) (providing a 
comprehensive discussion of the various escape devices employed by courts). 
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that their laws only grant rights when an injury occurs in their state.  Thus, 
if a court uses an escape device to permit the laws of a territorialist state to 
determine the rights of a plaintiff injured outside the state, the court is not 
properly applying the territorial approach.  Nevertheless, escape devices 
can make some intuitive sense.  For example, there would be something to 
recommend an escape device that would have permitted the Carroll court 
to decide that Alabama law could determine the rights of the parties in that 
case.  It would make no intuitive sense, however, for a court to determine 
that a state adhering to the territorial approach should determine the rights 
of parties if the injury occurs outside that state and a majority of other 
factors also point outside that state.  Nor would it make any intuitive sense 
for a court to determine that a state adhering to the territorial approach 
should not determine the rights of parties if the injury occurs in that state 
and a majority of other factors also point to that state. 
The foregoing discussion, concerning the mechanics of the territorial 
approach and how escape devices can affect that approach, speaks to 
nationwide fraud class actions in four important ways.  First, if a class 
action includes plaintiffs whose home states adhere to the territorial 
approach and those plaintiffs are defrauded in their respective home states, 
then the scope of those states‘ laws will reach the conduct harming their 
domiciliary plaintiffs.  Second, if the home state of a class action defendant 
adheres to the territorial approach and that defendant defrauds plaintiffs in 
their home states, then the laws of that defendant‘s home state cannot 
properly reach the conduct causing the plaintiffs‘ injury.  In other words, 
the laws of the defendant‘s home state cannot properly determine the rights 
of the plaintiffs and the defendant.  Third, the laws of any other state that 
adheres to the territorial approach would not reach conduct by a non-
domiciliary defendant that injures non-domiciliary plaintiffs in those 
plaintiffs‘ home states.  Fourth, these outcomes seem correct.  It would 
make no intuitive sense for a court to use an escape device to try to avoid 
them. 
The first point is relatively obvious.  When a fraud occurs within the 
borders of a state that has adopted the territorial approach, then that state 
views only itself as having a legitimate ability to determine the rights of the 
people injured, as well as the person who injured them.  The second point 
is that if the defendant‘s home state adheres to the territorial approach and 
the defendant defrauds plaintiffs in their home states, then the laws of the 
defendant‘s home state will not reach those injuries because they will have 
occurred outside the borders of the defendant‘s home state.  The third point 
is similar to the second point.  Any state, other than the plaintiffs‘ home 
states or the defendant‘s home state, that adopts the territorial approach, 
will not reach conduct that injures the plaintiffs in their home states 
because those injuries will have occurred outside that state‘s borders.  The 
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fourth point is that the first three points seem correct.  When a defendant 
injures a class of plaintiffs in their home states, it makes sense that a given 
plaintiff‘s home state would determine her rights as well as the rights of the 
defendant vis-à-vis that particular plaintiff. 
B.  Interest Analysis 
Although at one point all U.S. states adhered to the territorial approach 
and ten states continue to do so, the territorial approach does have its share 
of drawbacks.  As shown in Carroll, for example, the territorial approach 
can lead to outcomes that appear intuitively incorrect.  The reason cases 
like Carroll offend our intuitions is that the territorial approach only takes 
one factor—where an injury occurred—into consideration.  Thus, factors 
such as each party‘s domicile do not enter the calculus at all.  The territorial 
approach has been criticized for not considering any factor except the 
―place of the wrong‖ at least since the time of the Carroll decision, but it 
was not until Brainerd Currie developed the theory of ―governmental 
interest analysis‖ in the 1960‘s that a comprehensive alternative to the 
territorial approach was proposed.
27
 
Interest analysis applies general rules of statutory interpretation, well 
known in the intrastate context, to the interstate context.  In the intrastate 
context, courts first look to the text of a given statute to see if the text 
makes it clear that the statute was meant to reach the underlying factual 
scenario at issue.  If the statutory language shows that the statute clearly 
speaks to that factual scenario, then a court merely applies the statute to 
that scenario.
28
  If the text of a given statute does not provide a clear answer 
as to whether it is meant to reach a certain scenario, then a court will look 
to the underlying purposes of the statute to see if those purposes would be 
furthered by permitting the statute to reach the scenario at issue.
29
 
In the interstate context, courts are typically unable to look to the text 
 
 27. BRILMAYER, supra note 16, at 47. 
 28. See Cordray v. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, 122 Ohio St. 3d 361, 2009-
Ohio-2972, 911 N.E.2d 871, at ¶ 26 (determining that if the statutory text in one of Ohio‘s 
laws is unambiguous, then courts give the statute its unambiguous meaning); State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis. 2d 663, 681 N.W.2d 
110 (determining that when a Wisconsin statute ―yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, 
then there is no ambiguity, and [Wisconsin courts will apply the statute] according to this 
ascertainment of its meaning‖ (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶ 20, 260 Wis. 
2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656)). 
 29. See Bell Atlantic Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Comm‘r of Revenue Servs., 869 A.2d 611, 
622 (Conn. 2005) (interpreting a statute that was ambiguous on in its face in a way that 
furthered the legislature‘s purpose in enacting the statute); State v. Keyes, 2007 WI App 
163, ¶ 16, 304 Wis. 2d 372, 736 N.W.2d 904 (stating that when two or more interpretations 
of a Wisconsin statute are reasonable, Wisconsin courts ―look to case law examining the 
statute‘s legislative history and underlying purpose and policies to resolve the ambiguity‖). 
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of a given law to see if the text makes it clear that the statute was meant to 
reach a given factual scenario.  Legislatures almost never include clauses 
relating to scope in the statutes they promulgate.
30
  Therefore, interest 
analysis suggests, in analogy to intrastate statutory interpretation, that when 
it is unclear whether a law is meant to apply in a given interstate scenario, a 
court should look to the underlying purposes of that law to see if those 
purposes would be furthered by permitting the law to reach the scenario at 
issue.
31
  If the purposes underlying a given law would be furthered by 
permitting it to reach the factual scenario at issue, then a court using 
interest analysis would say that that state is ―interested‖ in having its laws 
determine the outcome of the factual scenario at issue.  But how does a 
court determine when the purposes underlying a state‘s laws would be 
furthered by permitting them to reach a given scenario?  In other words, 
when is a state ―interested‖? 
Currie assumed that the answer to this question was that states would 
act selfishly and claim an interest in having their laws determine the 
outcome of a matter when it would benefit one of their domiciliaries.
32
  
Currie used this assumption to simplify his analysis, and he expressly 
stated that he was not suggesting that states could actually adopt this 
position.
33
 
If a state actually adopted Currie‘s selfish state position, the state 
would probably violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Constitution.
34
  The selfish state position would, at least sometimes, lead a 
court to deny non-domiciliaries legal privileges on the basis that they were 
non-domiciliaries.
35
  Thus, interest analysis as originally devised by Currie 
was incomplete—it did not specify which interests would be 
constitutionally sufficient to permit a state to assert that its laws reached a 
given factual scenario. 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
―for a State‘s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally 
 
 30. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 35 (suggesting that legislatures do not tend to 
think about ―[h]ow their statutes are supposed to operate in multistate cases . . . .‖). 
 31. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of 
Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529, 543 (2010) (noting that interest analysis suggests courts ―should 
look to the underlying purposes behind the competing legal rules‖). 
 32. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 26, at 128 (citing Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s 
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958)). 
 33. See id. (―The question is not, for the moment, whether such an attitude would be 
shocking, or unwise, or unjust, or unconstitutional.  The question is whether it would be 
rational; and the answer is that it would.‖). 
 34. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides:  ―No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.‖  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 35. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 133 (arguing that ―[r]estricting the benefits of 
local law to locals is generally unconstitutional, at least within a state‘s borders‖). 
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permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.‖
36
  Thus, after Allstate, a state 
may constitutionally assert that its laws reach a given scenario when that 
scenario involves the state‘s interest in (a) regulating conduct within its 
borders, (b) protecting and compensating its citizens, or (c) regulating the 
conduct of its citizens.
37
  Allstate, however, only suggests what interests a 
state may constitutionally assert;
38
 it sets boundaries.  Allstate does not 
suggest what interests any given state will actually assert.
39
 
Only one state, California, currently adheres to interest analysis as its 
choice of law approach for frauds.  California has asserted interests in 
many different scenarios, and an exhaustive analysis of those scenarios is 
beyond the scope of this comment.  As a general matter, however, 
California frequently claims an interest in having its laws determine the 
rights of parties in scenarios where one of its domiciliaries is a party.
40
 
Therefore, if a nationwide class action includes plaintiffs domiciled in 
California who are defrauded in California, then the scope of California‘s 
laws would almost certainly reach the portion of the defendant‘s conduct 
that defrauded Californians in California.
41
  Moreover, if the defendant in a 
nationwide class action is domiciled in California, then California might 
also reach the defendant‘s conduct that defrauded the plaintiff class.
42
 
In the latter situation, however, California will be vying with other 
states for the ability to determine the rights of some plaintiffs.  For 
example, when a defendant injures a nationwide class of plaintiffs in their 
home states, the home states of plaintiffs adhering to the territorial 
approach will also reach the conduct causing the plaintiff‘s injury.
43
  Thus, 
the scope of two or more states‘ laws will overlap.  A court adjudicating the 
rights of the parties in such a class action would have to determine, in each 
instance of overlap, whether to give priority to the laws of the defendant‘s 
 
 36. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). 
 37. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 121 (stating interests that states may 
constitutionally assert). 
 38. 449 U.S. at 312-13. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont‘l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 725 (Cal. 1978) 
(determining that California has ―an interest in protecting California employers from 
economic harm because of negligent injury to a key employee,‖ even when the injury occurs 
in Louisiana). 
 41. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co., 598 P.2d 45, 55 (Cal. 1979) (using 
California‘s laws to determine the rights of a Californian who was defrauded in California). 
 42. See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 160 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding that California statutes grant causes of action to ―non-California 
members of a nationwide class where the defendant is a California corporation and some or 
all of the challenged conduct emanates from California‖). 
 43. See supra Subsection A. 
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home state or a given plaintiff‘s home state.
44
 
Questions of priority did not arise in the discussion of the territorial 
approach above because states that adopt the territorial approach do not 
have any need for such rules.  A ―territorialist‖ state does not believe that 
the laws of another state can reach a fraud occurring within its borders.  
Nor does a ―territorialist‖ state believe that its laws can reach a fraud 
occurring outside its borders.  Therefore, when all states adhered to the 
territorial approach, there was no need for rules of priority.
45
 
In contrast, the analytical framework of interest analysis shows that 
the laws of multiple states can reach a given scenario.  Once some states 
began adhering to interest analysis, it became possible for the laws of those 
states to reach conduct occurring wholly within the territorial boundaries of 
states continuing to adhere to the territorial approach.  Thus, states adhering 
to interest analysis adopt rules of priority stating the circumstances under 
which their laws receive priority over the laws of other states. 
As stated above, only California currently adheres to interest analysis 
as its choice of law approach for frauds.  And California‘s rule of priority is 
comparative impairment.
46
  In order to use comparative impairment a court 
must ―determine ‗the relative commitment of the respective states to the 
laws involved‘ and consider ‗the history and current status of the states‘ 
laws‘ and ‗the function and purpose of those laws.‘‖
47
 
Comparative impairment was actually created by Professor William 
Baxter.
48
  In Professor Baxter‘s words, comparative impairment is the idea 
―that a court can and should determine which state‘s internal objective will 
be least impaired by subordination in cases like the one before it.‖
49
  
Professor Baxter explicitly distinguishes comparative impairment from 
balancing the interests of states.
50
  Therefore, comparative impairment does 
not merely compare how important State A‘s policy is to State A in relation 
to how important State B‘s policy is to State B.  Rather, comparative 
 
 44. The distinction between scope and priority was developed by Professor Roosevelt.  
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 1-2 (outlining the general principles of scope and priority 
in choice of law analysis). 
 45. Even when all states adhered to the territorial approach, however, rules of priority 
could at times be necessary if the states defined causes of action differently.  For example, if 
New York had adopted the mailbox rule, but New Jersey had not, then New York would 
view a contract as formed within its borders when acceptance was mailed from New York to 
New Jersey, while New Jersey would view a contract as formed within its borders when 
acceptance was received in New Jersey. 
 46. Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1081 (Cal. 2001) 
(quoting Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont‘l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 727 (Cal. 1978)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
18 (1963) (establishing comparative impairment as a rule of priority). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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impairment examines how much the ―internal objectives‖ (policies) of 
State A will be impaired if State B‘s law is allowed to determine the rights 
of parties in a given matter, as compared to how much the policies of State 
B will be impaired if State A law is allowed to determine the parties‘ rights 
in that same matter. 
Theoretically, comparative impairment would maximize overall state 
utility in a given matter and would be an unbiased rule of priority.  The 
problem is that no one can actually do it.  It is impossible to know the 
extent to which State A‘s policies will be impaired if State B‘s laws are 
used to determine the rights of parties in a given matter.  Thus, comparative 
impairment is unpredictable, and invites manipulation.
51
 
Despite these problems, California does not seem to be trying to 
manipulate comparative impairment calculations in order to favor the laws 
of California.
52
  Therefore, if the California Supreme Court was faced with 
a California-domiciled defendant who injured a plaintiff in her home state 
and that state wanted its rules to determine the parties‘ rights, it is quite 
possible that the California Supreme Court would determine that the laws 
of California should yield to the laws of the plaintiff‘s home state.  By 
contrast, if the California Supreme Court were faced with a California-
domiciled plaintiff who was injured by a defendant acting in California, 
presumably California would prefer that its laws have priority. 
Although it is not clear that the California Supreme Court would come 
to these decisions, they do seem to be the correct decisions.  Comparative 
impairment is not really possible, but it does seem that the interests of State 
A could be impaired if the laws of State B were permitted to determine the 
rights of a State A plaintiff who is defrauded in State A.  On the other hand, 
it seems unlikely that interests of State B would be impaired if the laws of 
State A were permitted to determine rights in that situation. 
Thus, if a defendant‘s home state adheres to interest analysis and that 
defendant injures a plaintiff in her home state, the laws of the defendant‘s 
home state can properly reach the conduct causing the plaintiff‘s injury.  
 
 51. See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 68 (suggesting that although ―[c]omparative 
impairment is a nice idea‖ it will be problematic in practice because ―judges tend to ignore 
or misunderstand even quite basic features of most choice-of-law approaches, and the 
difference between comparative impairment and balancing is likely to escape them 
entirely‖). 
 52. See, e.g., Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1086 (Cal. 
2001) (determining that California laws could not be used as the rules of decision in a 
nationwide class action unless the trial court had considered the interest of the various 
plaintiffs‘ home states in having their laws serve as the rules of decision); Offshore Rental 
Co. v. Cont‘l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the trial judge ―correctly 
applied Louisiana, rather than California, law, since California's interest in the application of 
its unusual and outmoded statute is comparatively less strong than Louisiana's corollary 
interest, so lately expressed, in its ‗prevalent and progressive‘ law‖). 
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But if the defendant‘s home state adopts comparative impairment as its rule 
of priority, the defendant‘s home state ought to give priority to the laws of 
the plaintiff‘s home state.  Moreover, since the rights of a plaintiff and a 
defendant remain constant, regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to 
pursue her claims individually or in a class action,
53
 the following can be 
stated:  If the home state of a class action defendant adheres to interest 
analysis and has adopted comparative impairment as its rule of priority and 
the defendant defrauds a plaintiff in her home state, then the laws of the 
defendant‘s home state ought to defer to the laws of the plaintiff‘s home 
state, and let those laws determine the parties‘ rights. 
In summary, a state that has adopted interest analysis as its choice of 
law approach and comparative impairment as its rule of priority would 
almost certainly view its laws as reaching a situation where one of its 
domiciliaries is defrauded by a non-domiciliary within its borders.  And in 
that situation that state ought to determine that its laws have priority.  A 
state that has adopted interest analysis as its choice of law approach and 
comparative impairment as its rule of priority might also determine that its 
laws reach a situation where a domiciliary defendant defrauds non-
domiciliaries in their home states.  In that situation, however, the 
defendant‘s home state should not give its laws priority.  Rather, it should 
defer to the laws of the state where a given plaintiff was both injured and 
domiciled. 
C.  The Second Restatement 
Although interest analysis is important because our largest state, 
California, still adheres to it, the importance of interest analysis (as 
prescribed by Currie) is waning.  By contrast, twenty-four states currently 
adhere to the approach outlined in the Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws.
54
  And like interest analysis, the Second Restatement has an 
analytical structure that comprehends the idea that the laws of more than 
one state can reach a given fraud. 
 With regard to the tort of misrepresentation, the Second Restatement 
provides: 
When the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary harm on account of his 
reliance on the defendant's false representations and when the 
plaintiff's action in reliance took place in the state where the false 
 
 53. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 820 (holding that even in a nationwide class 
action, a court cannot abrogate parties‘ rights). 
 54. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington currently adhere to the 
Second Restatement in the torts context.  Symeonides, supra note 11, at 279. 
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representations were made and received, the local law of this 
state determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, 
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more 
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the 
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the 
other state will be applied.
55
 
Thus, when a defendant makes misrepresentations to the plaintiff in 
her home state, a state adhering to the Second Restatement would presume 
that the territorial approach is correct—the laws of the state where the fraud 
occurred should determine the rights of the parties.
56
  But the Second 
Restatement provides that that territorial presumption can be overcome if 
―some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles 
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties.‖
57
  Therefore, it seems that 
the territorial presumption will have an effect only if:  (1) no state is 
interested in having its laws serve as the rules of decision in a given 
matter;
58
 (2) the only interested state is the one where the fraud occurred; or 
(3) the interests of the state where the fraud occurred and the interests of 
the other interested state(s) are perfectly equal.
59
 
If a court is using the laws of a state that adheres to the Second 
Restatement to determine parties‘ rights and more than one state is 
interested in having its laws determine the rights of the parties, then that 
court must determine if a state other than the one where the injury occurred 
has a ―more significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties.‖
60
  
And whether another state has a more significant relationship depends on 
―the principles of § 6 in light of relevant contacts identified by [§ 148].‖
61
 
Section 6(2) states: 
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law 
include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1) (1971). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. If no state is interested in having its laws serve as the rules of decision, then a court 
using the laws of a state adhering to the Second Restatement to determine parties‘ rights 
ought to determine that those parties do not have any rights.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, The 
Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2522 (1999) (―[A] 
determination that no state is interested means that no state‘s law grants any rights.  The 
plaintiff loses; he fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.‖ (citing Larry 
Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062-63 (1989))). 
 59. In this case, the state(s) where the injury did not occur, but which is nonetheless 
interested, would not have a ―more significant relationship.‖  It would only have an equally 
significant relationship. 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1) (1971). 
 61. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 26, at 208. 
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(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests 
of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
62
 
Therefore, whether a state other than the one where the injury 
occurred has a ―more significant relationship‖ will be determined by 
considering those § 6 principles, in light of the following § 148 contacts: 
(2) . . . [T]he forum will consider such of the following contacts, 
among others, as may be present in the particular case in 
determining the state which, with respect to the particular issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties: 
(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the 
defendant‘s representations, 
(b) the place where the plaintiff received the representations, 
(c) the place where the defendant made the representations, 
(d) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties, 
(e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction 
between the parties was situated at the time, and 
(f) the place where the plaintiff is to render performance under a contract 
which he has been induced to enter by the false representation of the 
defendant.
63
 
As illustrated above, the Second Restatement suggests that courts take 
several different factors into account in determining whether a particular 
state has the ―most significant relationship.‖  This makes the Second 
Restatement somewhat unpredictable because it is often difficult to 
anticipate in advance which factors a court will treat as dispositive in a 
given case.
64
  Despite the unpredictability of the Second Restatement, if a 
 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). 
 63. Id. at § 148(2). 
 64. See, e.g., Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate 
Model, 93 MICH. L. REV. 703, 733 (1995) (―Although the Second Restatement's approach 
allows for individualized choice of law determinations, it is inherently uncertain and 
unpredictable.‖); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement 
(First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 361-64 (1997) (discussing how 
some courts consider § 6 without regard to the Second Restatement‘s presumptive rules, 
while other courts stress the policies behind the Second Restatement, or turn the Second 
Restatement into simple balancing). 
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court uses it properly, the court will determine that, under the Second 
Restatement,  when a domiciliary is defrauded in her home state by a 
defendant acting in that state, that state‘s laws should determine the parties‘ 
rights. 
Any analysis of fraud under the Second Restatement begins with § 
148(1), which presumes that the laws of the state where the fraud occurred 
will determine the rights of the parties.  Thus, for states adhering to the 
Second Restatement, there is a presumption that when a plaintiff is 
defrauded in her home state, the laws of that state should determine her 
rights.  Moreover, that presumption should only be rebutted when, in light 
of the contacts laid out in § 148, ―some other state has a more significant 
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the 
parties.‖
65
 
Under § 6(2)(b) courts are explicitly instructed to consider ―the 
relevant policies of the forum.‖  So, if a plaintiff sues a defendant in his 
home state, then that state‘s policies may be considered in light of the § 148 
contacts.  The fact that a plaintiff sues a defendant in his home state would 
also seem to implicate § 6(2)(g) because a court of the defendant‘s home 
state is presumably most familiar with its own state‘s laws.
66
  Moreover, 
even if a plaintiff chooses not to sue the defendant in his home state, but his 
home state is nonetheless interested in the matter, the policies of the 
defendant‘s home state would still be considered under § 6(2)(c).
67
  Section 
(6)(2)(d) seems to be inapplicable to the type of matters considered in this 
comment because it is a principle that speaks primarily to issues of 
contract.
68
  And §§ (6)(2)(a), (e) & (f) seem so broad and malleable that 
they can be shaped to favor the choice of any state‘s laws. 
Thus, depending on where a plaintiff sues a defendant, the laws of the 
defendant‘s home state could potentially be implicated by the policies 
espoused in either §§ 6(2)(b) & (g), or § 6(2)(c).  The Second Restatement, 
however, does not instruct courts to consider those policies in the abstract 
but, ―in light of relevant contacts identified by . . . [§ 148].‖
69
  And no § 
 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1) (1971). 
 66. Section 6(2)(g) instructs courts to consider ―ease in the determination and 
application of the law to be applied.‖  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
6(2)(g) (1971). 
 67. Section 6(2)(c) instructs courts to consider ―the relevant policies of other interested 
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue.‖  
Id. at § 6(2)(c). 
 68. Section 6(2)(d) involves ―the protection of justified expectations‖ which are usually 
not at issue in tort.  Id. at § 6(2)(d).  See also ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 82 (suggesting 
that § 6(2)(d) is not usually applicable to torts because it ―is one of the factors underlying 
the relatively broad freedom the Second Restatement gives contracting parties to choose the 
governing law‖). 
 69. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 26, at 208. 
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148 contacts appear to favor permitting the laws of the defendant‘s home 
state to determine the parties‘ rights when the defendant defrauds a plaintiff 
in her home state.  Rather, the § 148 contacts favor permitting the laws of 
the plaintiff‘s home state to determine the parties‘ rights. 
 Sections 148(2)(a), (b) and (c) would all seem to weigh in favor of 
using the laws of a plaintiff‘s home state when she is defrauded there.  
Section 148(2)(d) allows a court to consider the domicile of both parties, 
and thus, favors neither the plaintiff‘s nor the defendant‘s home state.  
Section 148(2)(e) refers to the ―tangible thing‖ which is at issue.  
Therefore, if § 148(2)(e) is applicable, it would also seem to weigh in favor 
of a plaintiff‘s home state when she is defrauded there.  Finally, § 148(2)(f) 
refers to the place where performance will be rendered under a contract that 
the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to enter.  Section 148(2)(f) is highly 
case specific, and will not as a general matter favor any state except a 
plaintiff‘s home state.  Plaintiffs typically perform contracts in their home 
states.
70
  Thus, some § 148 contacts will always weigh in favor of 
permitting the laws of a plaintiff‘s home state to determine the parties‘ 
rights, and usually no § 148 contacts will weigh in favor of permitting the 
laws of any other state to determine the parties‘ rights.   
 When the § 148 contacts only weigh in favor of the laws of a 
plaintiff‘s home state, no other state can have a more ―significant 
relationship to the occurrence and the parties,‖
71
 and the territorial 
presumption of § 148(1) cannot be rebutted.  Therefore, any state adhering 
to the Second Restatement ought to determine that when a defendant 
defrauds a plaintiff in her home state, the laws of the plaintiff‘s home state 
should determine her rights as well as those of the defendant.  Moreover, 
since the rights of a plaintiff and a defendant remain constant regardless of 
whether a plaintiff chooses to pursue her claims individually or in a class 
action,
72
 the following can be asserted:  any court using the laws of a 
Second Restatement state to determine parties‘ rights ought to decide that 
when a defendant defrauds a class of plaintiffs in their home states, the 
laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state should determine her rights, and 
the laws of that state should also determine the rights of the defendant with 
regard to his actions affecting that particular plaintiff. 
III.  RULE 23(B)(3) ANALYSIS 
The three subsections immediately above suggest that any state 
 
 70. See, e.g., In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation, 257 F.R.D. 46, 67 
(D.N.J. 2009) (presuming that consumers would perform contracts in their home states). 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1) (1971). 
 72. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 820 (holding that even in a nationwide class 
action, a court cannot abrogate parties‘ rights). 
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adhering to (A) the territorial approach, (B) interest analysis, or (C) the 
Second Restatement ought to decide that when a defendant defrauds a 
plaintiff in her home state, the laws of the plaintiff‘s home state should 
determine her rights, as well as those of the defendant.  Therefore, since 
thirty-five states currently adhere to one of those three approaches to choice 
of law, the laws of at least thirty-five different states will usually have to be 
considered to determine the various rights of a nationwide plaintiff class.  
This section assumes that this is true, and considers its effect on a plaintiff 
class seeking to certify a nationwide fraud class action under Rule 23(b)(3).  
This section concludes that when a defendant defrauds a nationwide class 
of plaintiffs in their home states and those plaintiffs seek to aggregate their 
claims in a 23(b)(3) class action, the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3) can be met, but the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) 
cannot be met. 
Rule 23 governs when class actions can be brought in federal court, 
and to be certified under Rule 23, a class action must be maintainable under 
one of Rule 23(b)‘s three subsections.  Most cases do not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), and therefore, if a case is 
maintainable as a class action in federal court it usually needs to satisfy 
Rule 23(b)(3).
73
  In order for Rule 23(b)(3) to be satisfied, the court 
deciding whether to certify a given class action must find ―that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.‖
74
  Moreover, Rule 23(b)(3) states that the matters 
pertinent to predominance and superiority include: 
(A) the class members‘ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
75
 
Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) instructs a court to consider the four factors listed 
immediately above when it is determining whether a plaintiff class meets 
the predominance and superiority requirements. 
The relation of Rule 23(b)(3)(A) to the predominance requirement 
seems relatively straightforward.  In some instances, it might be in a 
plaintiff‘s best interest to pursue her claims individually instead of in a 
 
 73. John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1419, 1432 (2003). 
 74. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 75. Id. 
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class action.  For example, a plaintiff may be able to increase her personal 
recovery if she pursues her claim individually.
76
  Rule 23(b)(3)(A) simply 
instructs courts, when deciding whether to certify a class action, to consider 
what is in the best interests of individual plaintiffs. 
Rule 23(b)(3)(B), like Rule 23(b)(3)(A), is relatively straightforward.  
It instructs courts to consider whether certifying a given class action will 
lead to duplicative litigation or coordination problems.
77
 
The relation of Rule 23(b)(3)(C) to the predominance inquiry is less 
straightforward.  On its face, Rule 23(b)(3)(C) seems to suggest that there 
might be a particular forum that would be preferable for a given class 
action.  In terms of predominance, if everyone is injured in one state (fact), 
or if the laws of one state would govern all the parties‘ rights (law), Rule 
23(b)(3)(C) seems to suggest it might make sense to have the litigation in 
that state. 
The aim of the rules advising committee in authoring Rule 
23(b)(3)(C), however, seems to have been the prevention of premature 
class actions.
78
  The rule makers were seeking to prevent courts from 
certifying large classes of mass tort victims when issues critical to the 
class‘s case, such as medical causation, were unsettled.
79
  The rule makers‘ 
fear seems to have been that if a mass tort class action was brought while 
key issues related to the tort were unsettled, an entire class of plaintiffs 
might be denied recovery because their case was brought prematurely.
80
 
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3)(D) seems to suggest that if a class action 
involves lots of plaintiffs alleging divergent facts that give rise to claims, 
which will be governed by different laws, it will be difficult to manage.  By 
contrast, if a class action involves plaintiffs all alleging the same facts 
giving rise to the same claims, which will be governed by the same laws, 
then that class action will not be much more difficult to manage than a 
traditional lawsuit involving two parties. 
The key question for the purposes of this comment is:  Can a court 
considering the Rule 23(b)(3) factors determine that a nationwide fraud 
 
 76. See Linda S. Mullenix, Should Mississippi Adopt a Class-Action Rule – Balancing 
the Equities: Ten Considerations that Mississippi Rulemakers Ought to Take Into Account in 
Evaluating Whether to Adopt a State Class-Action Rule, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 217, 235 
(2005) (stating that ―the aggregation of claims within a class action may effectively dilute 
the value of individual claims‖ (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A))). 
 77. See Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to 
Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1055 n.114 (2005) (explaining that ―a 
federal court could conclude under Rule 23(b)(3)(B) that the pendency of related state court 
actions may pose coordination problems that would diminish the utility of a federal class 
action‖). 
 78. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23 – What Were We Thinking?, 24 
MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 354 (2005). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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class action meets the predominance requirement?  The answer is that, in at 
least some instances, the predominance requirement can be met when a 
defendant defrauds a nationwide class of plaintiffs in their home states. 
The predominance requirement only requires predominance as to law 
or fact.
81
  Thus, if a given fraud was allegedly perpetrated against each 
plaintiff in the same way, fact issues involving the perpetration of that 
fraud would seem to be common to all class members.  Moreover, the fact 
that all the frauds were perpetrated in the same fashion might make the 
class relatively easy to manage, which would seem to imply that Rule 
23(b)(3)(D) might point in favor of certification.  A plain reading of Rule 
23(b)(3)(C) might also point in favor of certifying a class action brought in 
the defendant‘s home state if the defendant acted in a similar way (a fact 
question) toward all potential plaintiffs.  In that case, much of the factual 
information relating to how the defendant acted might be in his home state.  
Considering Rule 23(b)(3)(C) in light of its purpose of preventing 
premature mass tort class actions, however, undermines that reasoning to 
some extent.  But even if Rule 23(b)(3)(C) does not point in favor of 
predominance, there will almost certainly be instances when it is neutral 
and the other Rule 23(b)(3) factors do point in favor of predominance.  
Therefore, in at least some instances, it does seem that a nationwide fraud 
class action can meet the predominance requirement. 
In order for a plaintiff class to be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
however, a court must find that the class meets both the predominance 
requirement and the superiority requirement.  And the remainder of this 
section suggests that when a defendant defrauds a class of plaintiffs in their 
home states, the superiority requirement cannot be met.   
 As stated above, if one court adjudicates the rights of parties in a 
nationwide fraud class action, that court will have to review the laws of at 
least thirty-five different states to determine the rights of various class 
members.  The laws of all the states are not likely to be identical, and even 
if most of them are, it will be difficult for one court to determine what the 
law in thirty-five different states is.  Thus, there will be a manageability 
problem under Rule 23(b)(3)(D).  Moreover, Rule 23(b)(3)(C) will not 
favor certification because a single forum will have to consult the laws of 
thirty-five different states to dispose of a single class action.  There is no 
reason to think that the courts in a particular forum would be better at 
determining the laws of thirty-five different states than the courts in any 
other forum.  It is also important to remember that superiority is a 
comparative analysis.  Determining superiority involves a comparison 
between certifying the class at issue and permitting the plaintiffs to bring 
their claims in another manner.  One way plaintiffs could bring their claims 
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would be through statewide class actions.  The plaintiffs in a nationwide 
class action could be forced to split up and bring their claims with other 
plaintiffs from their own state. 
The issue is whether multiple statewide class actions, as compared to a 
nationwide class action, would more ―fairly and efficiently‖ adjudicate the 
parties‘ rights.
82
  Statewide class actions would definitely seem to be fairer.  
In each statewide class action, a court of the state whose laws would 
actually determine the parties‘ rights would be adjudicating those rights.  
And if a party felt that the court‘s decision was erroneous, she would at 
least have the possibility of being able to appeal that decision to the state‘s 
highest court—the ultimate expositor of the state‘s laws. 
Efficiency is a closer question.  Although a nationwide class action 
would allow all the parties‘ claims to be adjudicated in a single proceeding, 
that proceeding would involve the laws of at least thirty-five different 
states.  Statewide class actions would increase the number of proceedings, 
but each proceeding would be much simpler.  The laws of one state, the 
state in which the court sits, would be at issue.  Professor Brunet has shown 
that giving one court control over multiple claims in a single proceeding is 
only efficient up to a point.
83
  At some point, there is too much information, 
and the quality of the judicial output goes down.
84
  Requiring one court to 
consult the laws of at least thirty-five different states seems likely to 
surpass the point of too much information. 
Moreover, when nationwide fraud class actions have been adjudicated 
in federal court, the court has sometimes punted on the issue of what law 
should determine the rights of the parties.
85
  Thus, even if a single 
proceeding might be more efficient, some courts have refused to actually 
do the choice of law analysis.  This almost certainly prejudices at least 
some parties, and is not efficient.  Efficiency should be about getting the 
right outcome quickly with the least resources.  It should not be about 
getting any outcome regardless of whether it is correct. 
Multiple statewide class actions would more fairly adjudicate the 
rights of a nationwide class of plaintiffs when a defendant defrauds each 
member of the plaintiff class in her home state.  It also seems likely that 
several statewide class actions would more efficiently adjudicate the 
parties‘ rights.  Thus, when a defendant defrauds a nationwide class of 
 
 82. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 83. Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The 
Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 710-20 (1978). 
 84. Id. at 716-17.  Professor Brunet spoke with regard to joinder, but his general thesis 
is that at some point giving a court more information when it already has a lot of 
information will be inefficient. 
 85. See, e.g., In re Agent ―Orange‖ Product Liability Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 708 
(1984) (determining that regardless of where plaintiffs were from, their rights, and those of 
the defendant, would be governed by a ―national consensus law‖). 
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plaintiffs in their home states, multiple statewide class actions would be 
superior to a nationwide class action. 
IV.  ERRONEOUS DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS 
The previous section suggests that a court should not certify the claims 
of a nationwide class of plaintiffs under Rule 23(b)(3) when those plaintiffs 
are defrauded in their home states.  This section discusses two recent 
district court opinions that reached the opposite conclusion, and it suggests 
that each of those cases was erroneously decided because of a flawed 
choice of law analysis. 
A.  In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation 
In In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation,
86
 a nationwide 
class of plaintiffs sought recovery from Mercedes under the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act (―NJCFA‖).  The plaintiffs asserted that Mercedes 
violated the NJCFA by making ―statements or omissions of material facts 
that it knew or should have known were false or misleading when 
promoting vehicles purchased by Plaintiffs that were equipped with ‗Tele 
Aid.‘‖
87
  Tele Aid is ―an emergency response system which links 
subscribers to road-side assistance operators by using a combination of 
global positioning and cellular technology.‖
88
  The Tele Aid systems that 
were installed in all Mercedes vehicles during 2002-2004 and in some 2005 
and 2006 models, used an analog signal provided by AT&T.
89
  In August 
2002, however, the Federal Communications Commission (―FCC‖) 
adopted a rule that wireless communication companies, including AT&T, 
did not have to provide analog service after February 2008.
90
 
In light of the 2002 FCC rule, the plaintiffs in In re Mercedes-Benz 
alleged that ―Mercedes knew or should have known as early as August 8, 
2002 that analog Tele Aid systems would become obsolete in 2008, but 
continued to market those systems without disclosing their future 
obsolescence.‖
91
  The plaintiffs argued that Mercedes‘ failure to disclose 
the future obsolescence of analog Tele Aid systems violated the NJCFA 
and that every person who bought a Mercedes with an analog Tele Aid 
system after Mercedes knew of the future system‘s obsolescence was 
 
 86. 257 F.R.D. 46 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 87. Id. at 48. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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entitled to recover under the NJCFA.
92
  Therefore, the plaintiffs moved to 
certify a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(3) of all people who bought or 
leased a Mercedes with an analog Tele Aid system from August 2002 
onward.
93
  Such a class would include plaintiffs from all fifty states.
94
 
Mercedes opposed the plaintiffs‘ motion on the ground that ―each 
Plaintiff‘s claim is governed by the law of his or her home state, and the 
differences between those laws would render class treatment 
inappropriate.‖
95
  The court rejected Mercedes‘ argument,
96
 and granted the 
plaintiffs‘ motion for class certification.
97
 
In re Mercedes-Benz was a multi-district litigation.  Thus, the In re 
Mercedes-Benz court was required to look to the conflict of laws rules of 
the states where cases were originally filed to determine which state‘s laws 
should determine certain parties‘ rights.
98
  Several cases were originally 
filed in states that adhered to the Second Restatement as their choice of law 
approach for frauds.  Therefore, the In re Mercedes-Benz court was 
required to use § 148 of the Second Restatement. 
The court correctly laid out § 148 but misapplied it.  Recall that under 
§ 148(1) there is a presumption that ―when the plaintiff's action in reliance 
took place in the state where the false representations were made and 
received, the local law of this state determines the rights and liabilities of 
the parties.‖
99
  The In re Mercedes-Benz court presumed that the plaintiffs 
―received and relied on Mercedes‘ alleged misrepresentations in their home 
states.‖
100
  Thus, if the false representations were also made in the 
plaintiffs‘ home states, then the In re Mercedes-Benz court should have 
presumed that the laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state would 
determine her rights, and that the laws of that particular plaintiff‘s home 
state would also determine the rights of the defendant with regard to his 
actions affecting that plaintiff. 
In explaining how the plaintiffs felt they had been defrauded by 
Mercedes‘ omissions, the court cited advertisements for Tele Aid that 
touted Tele Aid‘s benefits while failing to mention that the system would 
be obsolete in a few years.
101
  If the plaintiffs actually heard these 
advertisements and relied on them to their detriment, then presumably the 
ads were made in the plaintiffs‘ home states.  A California plaintiff is not 
 
 92. Id. at 53. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 67. 
 95. Id. at 53. 
 96. Id. at 54. 
 97. Id. at 75. 
 98. Id. at 55 (citing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990)). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(1) (1971). 
 100. In re Mercedes-Benz, 257 F.R.D. at 66. 
 101. Id. at 50. 
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likely to be defrauded by a statement made in New Jersey. 
The In re Mercedes-Benz court, however, determined that ―[t]he 
alleged misrepresentations which form the basis of Plaintiffs‘ claim took 
place in New Jersey.‖
102
  The court reached this determination by relying 
on the plaintiffs‘ contentions that: 
[A]ll of Mercedes‘s actions relating to Tele Aid were planned 
and implemented by a ―Telematics team‖ based in Montvale, 
New Jersey.  That team oversaw the marketing and promotion of 
Tele Aid, coordinated with AT&T in anticipation of the 
discontinuation of analog service, and was responsible for 
deciding that Tele Aid subscribers would be charged 
approximately $1,000 to upgrade to digital equipment.
103
 
Even if those contentions are correct, however, they do not show that 
Mercedes‘ misrepresentations were made in New Jersey.  There is no such 
thing as fraud in the air.
104
  The fraud that may have been planned in New 
Jersey occurred in the states where the ads containing misrepresentations 
were distributed.  Thus, the In re Mercedes-Benz court erred in determining 
that Mercedes‘ misrepresentations were made in New Jersey.  The court 
should have determined that those misrepresentations occurred in the 
plaintiffs‘ home states.  Moreover, if the In re Mercedes-Benz court had 
made that determination, then it would have further determined that the 
presumption of Section 148(1) was applicable to the case, and that it would 
not have been rebutted.
105
 
Even if the In re Mercedes-Benz court is correct that Mercedes‘ 
misrepresentations were not made in the plaintiffs‘ home states, the court‘s 
analysis still seems erroneous.  After determining that § 148(1) was 
inapplicable to the case before it, the In re Mercedes-Benz court looked to 
the factors listed in § 148(2) to determine which state had ―the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.‖
106
 
The court acknowledged that ―four of the six considerations 
articulated by Restatement § 148(2) weigh in favor of applying the law of 
each class member‘s home state,‖
107
 yet the court treated § 148(2)(c)—the 
place where the defendant made the representations—as dispositive.
108
  
Thus, plaintiffs whose home states allowed a more generous recovery than 
 
 102. Id. at 66. 
 103. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 104. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) 
(explaining that a tort has not occurred unless a right has been violated). 
 105. As explained in Section III above, the presumption of § 148(1) will not be rebutted 
when a defendant defrauds a class of plaintiffs in their home states.  See supra pp. 511-515. 
 106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(2) (1971). 
 107. In re Mercedes-Benz, 257 F.R.D. at 67.  The court stated that §§ 148(2)(a), (b), (e) 
& (f) weighed in favor of each plaintiff‘s home state.  Id. 
 108. Id. at 68. 
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New Jersey were denied the chance to receive that recovery because even 
though those plaintiffs performed their obligations under the Tele Aid 
agreement in their home states, used their Tele Aids in their home states, 
and received and relied upon Mercedes‘ misrepresentations in their home 
states, Mercedes made representations in New Jersey.  Although the 
Second Restatement is unpredictable,
109
 it does not seem possible to say 
that New Jersey had the most significant relationship to every fraud at issue 
in In re Mercedes-Benz.  Thus, the In re Mercedes-Benz court performed a 
flawed choice of law analysis. 
If the court had performed a correct choice of law analysis, it would 
have determined that when a defendant defrauds a class of plaintiffs in their 
home states, the laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state should determine 
her rights, as well as the rights of the defendant vis-à-vis that particular 
plaintiff.  Moreover, if the In re Mercedes-Benz court had made that 
determination, its 23(b)(3) analysis should have been analogous to the 
23(b)(3) analysis in Section III above.  The In re Mercedes-Benz court 
should have determined that the plaintiffs before it could not meet the 
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 
B.  Kelley v. Microsoft Corp. 
In Kelley v. Microsoft,
110
 as in In re Mercedes-Benz, a nationwide 
class of plaintiffs was seeking recovery under a state consumer fraud act.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs in Kelley asserted that Microsoft violated the 
Washington Consumer Protection Act (―WCPA‖) by engaging in 
―deceptive practices to boost holiday sales of personal computers.‖
111
 
The plaintiff‘s argument proceeded as follows.  Microsoft delayed the 
release of its Vista operating system from March 2006 until early 2007.
112
  
Microsoft and personal computer manufacturers were worried that this 
delay would cause consumers to put off buying new computers until after 
the holiday season.
113
  Therefore, a few months before the 2006 holiday 
season, Microsoft began certifying certain computers as ―Windows Vista 
Capable,‖ and placed stickers on those computers that it certified.
114
  When 
Vista was eventually released, however, it came in several editions—a 
basic edition and several premium editions—and only the premium editions 
could run the new ―Aero‖ interface, which the plaintiffs asserted was the 
 
 109. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 110. 251 F.R.D. 544 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 548. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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essence of the Vista operating system.
115
  Therefore, the plaintiffs argued 
that anyone who bought a stickered computer that could only run the basic 
version of Vista had been deceived by Microsoft in violation of the 
WCPA.
116
  The plaintiffs moved to certify a nationwide class under Rule 
23(b)(3) of all people who purchased a computer with a ―Windows Vista 
Capable‖ sticker, which could only run the basic edition of Vista.
117
 
The Kelley court granted the plaintiffs‘ motion for certification.
118
  The 
court explained that the parties‘ agreed that the Second Restatement should 
be used to determine which state‘s laws govern the parties‘ rights.
119
  But 
the Kelley court, like the In re Mercedes-Benz court, misapplied § 148 of 
the Second Restatement. 
In explaining how the plaintiffs felt they had been defrauded, the 
Kelley court stated that the plaintiffs were confused when they saw the 
―Windows Vista Capable‖ sticker on computers.  For example, the court 
explained that one class member ―ordered his particular computer because 
‗it would handle Vista,‘ and that he was relieved when it arrived and had a 
‗Windows Vista Capable‘ sticker affixed to it.‖
120
  The same class member 
stated that he remembered ―seeing the Windows Vista marketing materials‖ 
and thought he was supposed ―to look for the sticker that said ‗Vista.‘‖
121
  
If other class members were deceived as this member was, then those class 
members would seem to have been deceived by statements made in their 
home states.  Presumably class members would see promotional materials 
in their home state, and have a computer they purchased sent to their home 
state.  Moreover, it seems that the plaintiffs received and relied on 
Microsoft‘s deceptive statements in their home states.
122
  Therefore, under 
§ 148(1) of the Second Restatement, there would be a presumption that the 
laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state should determine her rights, and 
that the laws of that particular plaintiff‘s home state should determine the 
rights of the defendant with regard to his actions affecting that particular 
plaintiff.  Moreover, that presumption would not be rebuttable under the 
facts of Kelley.
123
 
The Kelley court, however, reached a different conclusion.  It 
determined that the laws of Washington should govern all the parties‘ 
rights because the ―[d]efendant originated the allegedly deceptive scheme 
 
 115. Id. at 548-49. 
 116. Id. at 548. 
 117. Id. at 549. 
 118. Id. at 560. 
 119. Id. at 551. 
 120. Id. at 549. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 551-52. 
 123. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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in Washington.‖
124
  It is not clear that the place where a deceptive scheme 
is originated is a contact that § 148 instructs courts to consider, and it was 
certainly erroneous for the Kelley court to determine the rights of an entire 
class on the basis of that factor. 
If the Kelley court had conducted a correct choice of law analysis, it 
would have determined that when a defendant defrauds a class of plaintiffs 
in their home states, the laws of a particular plaintiff‘s home state should 
determine her rights, as well as the rights of the defendant vis-à-vis that 
particular plaintiff.  And if the court had made that determination, its Rule 
23(b)(3) analysis should have been analogous to the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis 
in Section III above. 
The In re Mercedes-Benz court and the Kelley court each certified the 
claims of a nationwide class of plaintiffs who were defrauded in their home 
states.  Each of those decisions was erroneous because of a flawed choice 
of law analysis.  If the In re Mercedes-Benz court and the Kelley court had 
performed correct choice of law analyses, each court would have 
determined that the class of plaintiffs before it could not meet the 
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The rights of a defrauded plaintiff, and the rights of the defendant who 
defrauded her, are delineated by state law.  The Constitution requires those 
rights to remain constant regardless of whether a plaintiff chooses to pursue 
her claims individually or in a class action.  Under the laws of thirty-five 
US states, those rights should be determined by a plaintiff‘s home state 
when she is defrauded in her home state by a defendant acting there.  Thus, 
if a nationwide class action is certified against a defendant who is 
domiciled in one of those thirty-five states, any court adjudicating that 
action would have to consult the laws of thirty-five different states to 
determine the rights of various plaintiffs. 
Consulting the laws of thirty-five states is very time consuming, and a 
single court is unlikely to be familiar with the laws of thirty-five different 
states, meaning that such a court is likely to make mistakes.  Given these 
issues, it seems that multiple statewide class actions would more fairly and 
efficiently adjudicate the rights of parties involved in a nationwide fraud 
than would a nationwide class action.  Therefore, the claims of plaintiffs 
affected by a nationwide fraud should not be certified as a nationwide class 
action under Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
 124. Kelley, 251 F.R.D. at 552. 
